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Introduction 
During the past few years NASA has spent many 
mill ions of dollars on studies of advanced 
missions and vehicles. Many of the studies were 
concerned with applications of nuclear rockets. 
Although some of the proposed uses seemed —rather 
improbable, the bulk of the work has contributed 
to an improved understanding of nuclear rocket 
utility. Consequently, the time has come to make 
another summary of the applications picture. 
The expected performance of solid-core nuclear 
rocket engines., is reasonably well defined. The 
principal areas of application are also well known. 
The uncertainties lie in questions of timing and 
relative emphasis and level of effort. When will 
men go to planets? When will nuclear rockets be 
operational? How extensively will we explore the 
moon? How many major space flight programs can 
we afford to pursue at one time? This paper offers 
no clairvoyance on these subjects. Rather, its 
purpose is to show how nuclear rockets can be,
 
flight and to offer a few coon-sense thoughts 
on the missions and their 1jements—for--ad-_ 
vanced propulsion systems 
Application Areas 
One way of vie" the overall apace program 
is shown in figure 1. Across the top of the 
matrix are listed the three major regions of 
space flight: Earth orbit, lunar, and planetary. 
Arranged vertically are three plateaus of space 
flight effort: unmanned, early manned, and opera-
tional manned flight. Currently-approved programs, 
such as Apollo and Gemini, are marked with an 
asterisk. 
Those areas of space flight to which nuclear 
rocket propulsion is applicable tend to lie in the 
lower righthand part of the chart. Included in 
these categories are the more difficult space 
missions, with high energy requirements and heavy 
payloads. This paper discusses applications of 
nuclear rockets to (1) manned lunar exploration 
beyond the initial landings and the subsequent 
operations using Apollo-type hardware, (2) un-
manned planetary missions involving heavy payloads, 
and (3) manned missions to the near planets. The 
latter continues to be regarded as the primary justification for nuclear rockets in the future 
space program. 
Manned Planetary Missions 
Point of View 
A point of view regarding manned planetary 
exploration is presented in the following para-
graphs. First of all, manned flight to Mars and 
Venus is held to be the major space objective in 
the 1980's, requiring preparation throughout the
1970's. Manned planetary flight will be, at the 
time of the early expeditions, a very difficult 
undertaking. The advancements we make in nuclear 
propulsion and other technologies in the next ten 
to fifteen years will make these journeys possible 
but not easy. 
One reason for the difficulty of these missions 
is the desire to do an adequate job of exploration 
with a generally acceptable level of risk. This 
desire will rule out trying early, high-risk, strip-
ped-down missions. An adequate crew with adequate 
exploration equipment and life support will be 
insisted upon. 
From a review of the many studies of manned 
planetary expeditions, the diversity of possible 
and proposed mission modes is apparent. Our point 
of view is that only reasonable extensions of 
capability should be counted on in the various 
areas of technology. Operational nuclear rockets 
for planetary spaceflight are considered reasonable. 
Certain other techniques which have been proposed 
are judged to be less reasonable. For example, 
there are mission modes which reduce energy re-
quirements and atmosphere-entry speeds significant-
ly but which are of about two and a half years' 
duration. An unreasonable burden seems to be 
shifted onto the life-support and human-factors 
areas and onto the reliability of systems which 
must operate for most of the trip. Nuclear propul-
sion brings 400-500-day trips into the reasonable 
range of initial weight in orbit. 
The desire to do an adequate job of exploration 
with only moderate increases in technical capabil-
ity will force the manned planetary vehicle to-
ward excessive initial weight. Under such circum-
stances the performance advantages of nuclear 
rockets will be very important. The solid-core 
nuclear rocket is expected to be the most advanced 
propulsion system operational in the time period of 
early manned planetary flight. Furthermore, the 
useful time period for nuclear rocket application 
will be long enough to warrant the development of a 
manned planetary flight capability based on this 
type of propulsion. 
These statements regarding nuclear rocket ap-
plicability imply certain assumptions about other 
advanced propulsion systems and concepts. The 
scope of this paper permits only a brief statement 
of viewpoint. Nuclear-electric propulsion is re-
garded as a possible contemporary of solid-core 
nuclear rockets, particularly if the low-accelera-
tion systems are to be used in conjunction with 
high-acceleration systems for operations in plane-
tary gravitational fields. Other advanced concepts, 
including gas-core nuclear rockets and nuclear-
pulse rockets, are considered to be in a later time 
frame. At least, they are not well enough under-
stood to permit scheduling in the same time period 
as solid-core nuclear rockets.
OMF
Reference Mission Mode 
While trajectory innovations are still being 
uncovered, a reference mission mode can be defined 
for early manned Mars missions. By reference mode 
is meant that mode which, at the moment, appears 
to be the first choice and against which all al-
ternate modes should be compared. 
The trajectory would be an opposition-class 
raundtrip, characterized by a relatively short 
duration of 400 to 500 days. The hazards of the 
space environment, the psychological problems of 
long space journeys, and the difficulty of provid-
ing high component reliability for years of opera-
tion will cause emphasis to be placed on relatively 
short trip times. Furthermore, crew size tends to 
be proportioned to trip time. By comparison, the 
duration of a long-duration (conjunction-class) 
trip would be 800 to 1000 days. 
Propulsion on the reference mission mode 
would be provided by three nuclear rocket stages: 
the first to leave Earth orbit, the second to 
brake into Mars orbit, and the third to leave Mars 
orbit • No propulsion would be provided at Earth 
return unless the speed of the spacecraft exce-
eded a reasonable speed for direct entry into the 
atmosphere. A reasonable entry speed is judged 
to be about 50,000 feet per second. Any higher 
capability would be very advantageous, but our 
opinion favors 50,000 as a value that can be 
counted on for the 1980 time period. This is a 
controversial area and deserves much attention. 
Chemical rocket braking is assumed because of the 
small weight of the entry module. 
It should be kept in mind that these mode 
specifications refer to early missions. later 
sections wil l  discuss alternatives which may be 
adopted for operational missions. There is also 
an interesting possibility in the family of Mars 
trajectories which swing by Venus on either the 
way out or the way back. For the purposes of this 
report the Venus swingby is considered part of the 
opposition-class trajectory family. 
Initial Weight Requirements 
For comparisons of Mars-mission propulsion 
systems, the payload weights can be assumed fixed 
and the comparison made on the basis of initial 
weight in Earth orbit. Initial weight is a func-
tion of (1) payload weights, (2) mission energy 
requirements and (3) propulsion and vehicle per-
formance parameters. Even with all the studies 
conducted in this area, payload weights and veloc-
ity increments still vary considerably from study 
to study. This is normal in an early definition 
phase. However, by specifying a reference mission 
mode and adopting the most generally accepted 
estimates of spacecraft module weights, a satis-
factory comparison of propulsion systems can be 
made.
Build-up of Initial Weight Figure 2 may be 
instructive in visualizing the build-up of initial 
weight in Earth orbit. The example is an opposi-
tion-class trip in an unfavorable year. Two pay-
loads are shown in the center of the chart: (1) 
the return payload, consisting of mission module 
and Earth-entry module, and (2) the exploration 
payload, made up of one or more Mars excursion
modules and any other weight left at Mars. In this 
instance, the two payload weights are assumed to be 
nearly equal: 130,000 pounds for the return pay-
load and 100,000 pounds for the exploration pay-
load. However, a payload carried through three 
propulsion periods is more costly in initial weight 
than one that goes only to Mars. This is shown by 
the leverage factors (or multiplication or sensi-
tivity factors, if you prefer). The exploration 
payload contributes only 400,000 pounds to the 
initial weight of the nuclear rocket; the return 
payload accounts for 1,700,000 pounds. For the 
chemical rocket, in the righthand bar, the contri -
bution of the return payload is even more dominant. 
The lower specific impulse causes the leverage 
factors to increase and their ratio to grow in the 
direction of greater sensitivity to return payload. 
The primary purpose of Figure 2 is to illus-
trate the great importance of the mission-module 
and entry-module weights in determining initial 
weight. With this orientation, we can appreciate 
the significance of a prediction that 6-8 men (rather than 3) are needed in the crew of a 400-
500-day Mars mission or a calculation that shows 
the Earth retro rocket weighing three times as 
much as the entry module (the penalty for a limited 
entry speed). 
Initial Weight Comparison In Figure 3 the 
results of several such calculations are plotted in 
terms of initial weight vs. launch date. The ex-
ample is for a constant trip time of 420 days with 
40 days stay time at Mars. Pa yloads are the same 
as in the previous figure. This figure illustrates 
three things: (1) that nuclear rockets are supe-
ior in initial weight to chemical rockets by 
factors of 2-3, even in low-energy years, (2) that 
the effect on initial weight of limiting Earth- 
atmosphere-entry speed to 50,000 feet per second 
varies from 20-35% in a bad year to nothing in a 
good year, and (3) that the effect of a 100-second 
change in nuclear rocket specific impulse would be 
about 30% in initial weight, which is important 
but does not make or break the case for nuclear 
rockets. Although the shapes of the curves are 
not accurate, the 17-year cycle is illustrated and 
shown to be nearly eliminated for nuclear rockets 
when unlimited entry speed can be handled without 
retro propulsion. Chemical-rocket performance is 
much more sensitive to entry speed and energy 
cycles because this form of propulsion is very 
marginal-in this application. 
In addition to the obvious comparison of 
nuclear and chemical rockets for Mars missions, 
figure 3 shows the magnitude of initial weight 
which will result from the requirements of adequate 
exploration and only reasonable extensions of 
technology. The overall range is 1.5 to 3 million 
pounds in Earth orbit. A nominal value of 2 million 
pounds appears to be a good target for a flight in 
the early 1980's, using values of specific impulse 
and entry speed considered consistent with the 
time period. These initial weights are compatible 
with projected launch vehicles, whereas correspond-
ing chemical-rocket weights are marginal at best. 
In later launch opportunities, when the desired pay-
loads will have increased, the same basic vehicle 
will be applicable. Energy requirements will be 
lower in the mid and late 1980's and system per-
formance will have been improved through experience. 
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Technique	 % Weight Reduction 
Bi -planet encounter 
Perihelion braking 
Mars atmosphere braking 
Mars elliptic capture 
Hyperbolic rendezvous 
Multi-vehicle modes
to 40 (7) 
+ or - 
to 30 
20 - 3 (idea].) 
5 - 25 
less than 10
Weight Reduction Techniques Of course, the 
picture is never this simple and straightforward. 
Many techniques can be considered, for reducing 
the weight in orbit. The most important ones are 
listed in the following table along with approxi-
mate weight-reductions. The percentages apply to 
nuclear rocket vehicles; corresponding percentages 
for chemical rockets would be greater. 
Initial Weight Reduction
Use of more than one vehicle, as proposed in 
the last two listed techniques, complicates the 
mission without much gain. In hyperbolic rendezvous 
the Mars craft is et in the vicinity of Earth by 
a shuttle vehicle. Consequently, the Earth-entry 
module need not be carried to Mars, and the initial 
weight of the interplanetary vehicle is reduced by 
5 to 25%. However, the total weight of the two 
vehicles may not be reduced. Sending two vehicles 
to Mars, an unmanned one by a low-energy trajectory 
and a manned one by a high-energy path, would 
lowe the total initial weight by no more than 
].D%.' A convoy, with two or more vehicles travel-
ing together, would not be intended to reduce 
initial weight. Its purpose would be to increase 
mission success probability through use of inter-
changeable modules. Some of these multi-vehicle 
modes may find application in later operational 
phases of space transportation. 
With the exception of the bi -planet encounter, 
these weight-reduction techniques are either un-
attractive or unlikely to be usable in early mis-
sions. In a bi -planet encounter (known also as 
Venus kick, Venus swingby or Venus flyby), the 
spacecraft flies close by Venus on either the out-
bound or return trajectory of an opposition-class 
Mars round trip. 2
 The gravitational deflection of 
Venus is planned to modify the basic path in such 
a way that the Earth atmosphere-entry velocity is 
kept below 40,000 feet per second. The total trip 
time is extended by no more than a few months at 
the most. The payoff from this technique varies 
from one opportunity to another and is not yet 
fully analyzed, but weight reductions up to 40% 
seem possible. Furthermore, there is reason to 
believe that worthwhile trajectories of this type 
can be found in every launch opportunity. This 
technique appears (at the time this paper is writ-
ten) to be a candidate for the reference mission 
mode, especially because of the opportunity to get 
data on two planets with one trip and one vehicle. 
The only other technique which rates special 
attention is Mars atmospheric braking. The payoff 
is large; the initial-weight reduction for use of 
Mars aerobraking in a nu4ear-rocket spacecraft 
may be as high as 20-33%. However, this capabil-
ity will be hard to develop because of the inac-
cessibility of the Mars atmosphere and the teleme-
try problems of probe experiments. A reasonable 
assumption is that early flights will use propul-
sive braking into Mars capture orbit and that aero-
braking will be introduced later • The necessary 
experiments in the Mars atmosphere could be among 
the accon].ishaents of the early manned missions. 
The other techniques are of lesser interest. 
Perihelion braking, involving propulsive braking 
at the highest velocity point in the return 
trajectory, may result in either a reduction or an 
increase in initial weight. The outcome depends 
upon the nominal Earth-approach speed and the ratio 
of weights to be decelerated at periIlion and at 
atmosphere entry. Elliptic capture at Mars offers, 
in theory, a significant reduction in initial 
weight, typically 20-35%. 3 However, this advantage 
may largely vanish when launch-delay penalties and 
increased l and i ng-system requirements are accounted 
for. Elliptic capture orbits seem like an interim 
mode at best, perhaps reserved as a last resort in 
case the vehicle falls short of its design perfox-
ance.
Operational Requirements 
Simplified analysis, such as those used in 
this paper to illustrate basic relationships, 
generally ignore the inevitable practical considera-
tions. Operational capability demands launch 
windows and allowances for launch delays in orbit; 
auxiliary propulsion systems must be added for mid-
course velocity increments; non-optimum components 
and systems will be used in order to take advantage 
of previous developments and to minimize the number 
of new items needed. 
Although each of these factors makes only a 
small  addition to initial weight, the cumulative 
effect will not be negligible. Consequently, the 
weights shown in comparisons like figure 3 should 
be regarded as somewhat optimistic, at least for 
early flights. Mid-course AV's are in the hundreds 
of feet per second; launch -delay LV' a may be in the 
thousands. The overall effect is likely to be a 
10-20% increase in initial weight. 
An example of launc delay from Mars orbit is 
illustrated in figure 47 The problem is that an 
orbit about the planet, circular or elliptic, will 
regress at a rate of several degrees per day. If 
the departure date is known at the time of arrival, 
an initial orbit plane can be selected so that it 
will regress to the proper orientation for depar-
ture. However, any delay in the scheduled depar-
ture will cause the orbit inclination to be wrong 
for the desired heliocentric transfer orbit. Thus, 
a plane-changeAV is shown in figure lI. Further-
more, if a constant Earth-return date is to be 
maintained, each day of delay shortens the return 
flight time accordingly. An additional AV is shown 
for this provision. Since the nominal Mars-depar-
ture LV will be in the range of 15,000-20,000 feet 
per second, each additional WOO allowed for launch 
delay will add over 5% to the vehicle initial 
weight in Earth orbit. 
Propulsion System Requirements 
The propulsion of a 2-million-pound space 
vehicle requires a nuclear rocket engine of several 
thousand megawatts. Figure 5 shows the major 
factors which, from a parametric performance stand-
point, influence the choice of engine power. 
Initial weight in Earth orbit is plotted against 
total reactor power in the Earth-departure propul-
sion system. A 1983 opposition-class trip is used
for illustration. The important fact is that the 
initial weight is about 2 mi lli on pounds. 
The curves of constant unit-engine power show 
the penalty associated with clustering large numbers 
of low-power engines. Optimum first-stage thrust-
weight ratio is almost constant at about 0.2. There-
fore, the number of engines is nearly inversely 
proportional to unit thrust. Use of four 2000-Mw 
engines rather than two 5000-Mw engines results in 
an increase in vehicle weight of about 15%. The 
difference between 3500 and 5000 Mw is less than 5%. 
The selection of unit-engine power cannot be 
made solely on the basis of Earth-orbit propulsion. 
The usefulness of the thrust level in later stages 
of the Mars craft must also be considered, as well 
as in other possible applications in the space pro-
gram. Figure 5 is based on single engines of the 
indicated power being used in the Mars-arrival and 
Mars-departure stages. Since Mars departure gross 
weight is about 300,000 pounds, a power of 3500 or 
5000 Mw is well above optimum. However, in the 
interest of minimizing the amount of engine develop-
ment, use of a single engine power may be desirable. 
The data in Figure 5 include the penalties for using 
only a single engine power in all stages, thereby 
narrowing the differences in resultant initial 
weight. From these considerations, it is likely 
that the nuclear rocket propulsion systems for a 
manned Mars expedition would consist of (1) a 
cluster of 2 or 3 engines in the Earth-departure 
stage, with unit -engine power being about 5000 Mw 
(250,000 pounds thrust), (2) a single engine of the 
same rating for Mars-orbit attainment, and (3) 
another single engine for Mars departure. Because 
of the weight penalties and operational problems 
associated with aftercooling and restart, the reuse 
of an engine is not included in the reference mis-
sion mode. Clustering, however, appears to be a 
necessity, although close clustering may not be re-
quired. In fact, the clustering of tanks, each with 
its own engine, may be the most easily developed 
and utilitarian configuration. 
Manned Lunar Missions 
Point Of View 
Our point of view regarding manned lunar mis-
sions is given in this section. This is a hard 
area to clarify because we must deal with the real 
wor.of existing stages and approved-program 
schedules. The objective of this paper is to show 
how nuclear rockets could be used to advantage in 
several possible phases of post-Apollo lunar ex-
ploration. 
Manned lunar operations can be divided into 
four phases: (1) initial landings and orbital recon-
naissance, (2) early exploration, (3) extended ex-
ploration, and (1) exploitation of lunar resources. 
The first two will be carried out using Apollo-type 
hardware. Personnel transport would be by means of 
the Apollo/LEM. Logistic support would use a cargo 
version of LEM or, possibly, a new direct cargo 
lander sized to go on the all-chemical Saturn V. 
If the initial exploration shows reason to expand 
the scale of lunar operations, a period of extended 
exploration would be entered, calling for larger 
accumulations of equipment on the moon and higher 
launch rates. Later, again depending upon what is
found on the moon, a phase of exploitation may be 
entered. The fondest hope is that a source of 
rocket prope].lants will be found. 
For lunar missions beyond early exploration, 
there may be a demand for development of a new 
Saturn V third stage or an orbit-launch stage. In 
this time period, probably the mid to late 1970's, 
the Saturn V could be an uprated version. For ex-
tended exploration a logical set of new developments 
would be an expendable nuclear-rocket-propelled 
third stage on Saturn V and appropriate lunar 
logistic stages. A further enlarged rate of traffic, 
as in an exploitation phase, would call for reduc-
tion of transportation costs. Reusable surface-to-
orbit shuttles would be used at each terminal, and 
a reusable ferry would carry both men and materials 
between Earth and lunar orbits. The ferry could 
use nuclear rocket propulsion, provided the neces-
sary engine lifetime and restart characteristics 
can be achieved. 
As we consider and determine the course of 
lunar operations, we must also consider the desire 
to gain experience with an advanced propulsion 
system. Since nuclear rocket propulsion will be 
used later, it makes sense to introduce it early--
as early as the capability becomes available at no 
penalty in cost effectiveness. On this basis, it is 
reasonable to expect that all new major stages will 
be nuclear rocket stages. Of course, this state-
ment applies primarily to large space stages and 
probably not to stages which operate to or from a 
surface, have small payloads (under about 100,000 lb), 
or start much below orbit. Such a recommendation 
is similar to that which led to the introduction of 
hydrogen-oxygen upper stages in the Saturn family. 
Early experience would have a large payoff in re-
liability and solution of operational problems. 
Lunar Payloads 
The pertinent payload numbers for various 
Saturn V third stages are shown on figure 6. Weight 
landed on the moon is plotted against vehicle weight 
at third-stage cutoff, i.e., weight boosted to 
lunar transfer velocity. Nuclear propulsion is 
used only up to lunar transfer velocity. The upper 
line shows landed payload for an unmRnned logistic 
carrier. The next lower lime is for a manned craft 
with return capability. The landed payload is less 
because of added shielding and instrumentation 
weights in the manned nuclear stage. 
The amount of landed payload required to give 
3-man return capability is shown by the dashed line, 
leaving the shaded area to represent the excess 
capability of the higher performance systems. It 
should be borne in mind that this excess payload 
may not be useful in just any way desired. Volume 
restrictions or other configuration constraints 
may make this payload capability less effective 
than a comparable weight on a strictly cargo flight 
However, most of the weight should be useful for 
supplying provisions for the crew, thereby provid-
ing added steytime. A landed weight of 650 pounds 
per 3 man days of staytim
°
 extension has been esti - 
mated for this situation. 
Along the abscissa are spotted the payloads 
of several versions of a three-stage Saturn V. The 
basic, all-chemical vehicle is shown to put about 
95,000 pounds onto a lunar trajectory, resulting
in 28,000 pounds of cargo landed. Substituting a 
nuclear orbit-launch third stage, labeled S-NA, 
for the S-IVB stage raises the cargo weight to 
37,000 pounds. With the standard first and second 
stages of Saturn V and sub-orbit start of the 
nuclear rocket stage, labeled S-NB, the landed 
cargo weight is 47, 000 pounds. Another combination 
is an uprated Saturn V and appropriate nuclear rock-
et third stages. If the all-chemical uprated ve-
hicle is capable of injecting 134,000 pounds Onto 
lunar transfer orbit, a landed payload of 115,000 
pounds may be attained. Almost any other amount 
of uprating could have been assumed, but the cor-
responding landed weights would also lie along the 
performance line in figure 6. With a nuclear orbit-
launch stage the uprated Saturn V is estimated to 
put down 60,000 pounds of lunar cargo. 
For the Apollo/Direct mode, wherein three men 
are landed directly on the surface without lunar 
orbit rendezvous, the S-NA on a standard Saturn V 
has only marginal capability. The S-NB on the 
standard lower stages would do about as well as an 
all-chemical uprated. Saturn V • Substitution of an 
orbit-launch nuclear stage for the modified S-IVB 
stage (assumed to have an enlarged tank and new 
engine) would provide very large cargo weights to 
be landed on the same flight as the crew. The total 
number of launches to support a lunar station should 
be decreased accordingly. 
Propulsion System Requirements 
All of the manned lunar missions are assumed to 
involve nuclear-stage weights of 250,000-650,000 
pounds, i.e • one or two low-orbit payloads of a 
standard or uprated Saturn V. Consequently, the 
desired thrust of the nuclear-rocket engine is 
50,000-200,000 pounds (reactor power, JOO -11000Mw). 
For propulsion of a spacecraft which is a single 
Saturn V payload the desired thrust is 50,000-
125,000 pounds (1000-2500 Mw). 
Comparing these numbers with the requirements 
for manned planetary missions, we see that the two 
ranges of desired thrust are centered on different 
optimum values. A middle range exists in which a 
single thrust level could serve either application, 
but both systems would be somewhat off-optimum. A 
3500 -5000 Mw engine would be heavier than optimum for a Saturn V third stage, especially for a 
standard Saturn; a 1000-2500 Mw engine would require 
more clustering than is desirable for a manned Mars 
mission, especially if our estimates of initial 
weight turn out to be low. The weight penalties 
associated with excess engine weight or low thrust 
would reduce the nuclear payload advantage, but 
such a compromise cannot be ruled out. The final 
selection of engine power(s) will depend on many 
factors in addition to payload optimization. 
Unmanned Interplanetary Missions 
Figure 7 presents a summary of interplaneary 
payload performance of Saturn V based systems. 
These are for one-way trips, either into a planetary 
orbit or a flyby to the cited location. The solid 
bars show the capability of an all-chemical Saturn 
V with a cryogenic fourth stage; the striped bars 
extend to the payload of a Saturn V with a nuclear 
third stage. Nuclear payloads are shown to be 50-
80% higher than an-chemical payloads. This in-
creased capability could also be converted into 
shorter trip times.
Three questions need to be answered with regard 
to the use of nuclear-rocket propulsion in unmanned 
missions: (i) How much interest is there in such 
high-payload missions? (2) Will there by an opera-
tional nuclear-rocket stage in the time period 
when these high-payload missions should be flown? 
(3) Are there more appropriate advanced propulsion 
systems for such missions? Obviously, the answers 
are yet to be worked out. The area of unmanned 
support of manned planetary missions may be the 
most likely place to find a requirement for 50,000 
pounds in Mars orbit. Such a spacecraft could do 
a good job of determining atmosphere characteristics, 
surface conditions and the space environment. Ade-
quate power (e.g. SNAP 8) and communications equip- 
ment could be carried to send back useful quantities 
of engineering data. Long-lived automated labora-
tories could be placed on the planetary surface. 
The question of availability implies that a 
nuclear-rocket stage would not be specially develop -
ed for unmanned missions; the question regarding 
alternate propulsion concepts implies that some-
thing like a nuclear-electric stage would be devel-
oped solely to perform unmanned missions. The 
close relationship between manned lunar missions 
and these unmanned interplanetary missions is ob-
vious: they both involve upper stages on the 
Saturn V. Therefore, a nuclear-rocket third stage 
developed for lunar exploration could also serve to 
send many extra tons of instruments to these other 
interesting places. So could a nuclear-electric-
propelled spacecraft. In fact, the combination of 
high-and low-acceleration nuclear systems would be 
superior to either used separately. 
The answers to these questions will probahl.y 
lie in the success we have in perfecting nuclear 
propulsion systems. Planning of the overall space 
program, including both manned and unmanned mis-
sions to the moon and planets and in interplanetary 
space, will eventually lead to recommendations re-
garding development of new stages and advanced 
propulsion systems. In the meantime performance 
estimates, such as figures 6 and 7 and corresponding 
data for other systems, must be kept up to date. 
Such data, supported by demonstrations of the valid-
ity of the predictions, will help program planners 
to phase in new systems and evolve a versatile sta-
ble of vehicles.
Concluding Remarks 
This summary of nuclear rocket applications 
should make clear the following points: 
(1) Nuclear rocket propulsion offers signifi-
cant advantages in the next round of space explora-
tion missions beyond Apollo. (2) Early introduction of nuclear rocket 
propulsion, as soon as the capability becomes avail-
able, will be a great aid to later applications. 
Therefore, nuclear rockets should be seriously 
considered for all new major vehicle stages, except 
possibly those for surface use, —all payloads (under 100,000 lb.) or very high thrust (second 
stage boost). 
(3) Manned planetary missions, in particular, 
will benefit from nuclear rockets. The missions 
will be very difficult in any case; without nuclear 
rockets the initial weights in Earth orbit would 
be unreasonable.
(l) Manned lunar missions also stand to bene -
fit from nuclear rockets, at least in later phases 
of exploration or exploitation. The number of 
launches can be reduced., and direct landing flights 
can carry both men and cargo. 
(5) A propulsion system and stage developed 
for manned lunar flight could also serve in (a) 
unmanned interplanetary missions, wherever very 
large payloads are needed, and (b) the planetary-
departure phase of a manned Mars or Venus mission, 
with some refinements made to handle long term 
space storage. 
The exact way in which nuclear rockets are 
used in the space program will depend upon many 
factors other than payload. comparisons. One of 
the primary influences will be the relative empha-
sis placed on manned operations in Earth orbit, on 
the moon, and to the near planets. An equally 
strong influence will be the experience in the 
nuclear rocket development program, which will 
indicate the possible characteristics and availa-
bility dates of the propulsion systems. Mission 
studies will continue to explore the various ap-
plication areas. Capabilities and modes of opera-
tion will become more clearly defined. In the 
meantime, our point of view is that solid core 
nuclear rockets will power the next generation of 
manned space vehicles.
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